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SPLITS IN THE ROCK. THE CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SEMINOLE
ROCKDEFERENCE DOCTRINE BY THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS
KEVIN 0. LESKE*
The Seminole Rock deference doctrine instructs federal courts to defer to an
administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation unless the interpretation "is
plainy erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." nTis crucial administrative law
doctrine has largey escaped judicial and scholary examinationfor close to seventy years.
And this is astonishing because, as Chief Justice Roberts recenty observed, this deference
doctrine goes "to the heart of administrative law" and Seminole Rock questions "arise
as a matter of course on a regular basis."
But, at long last, a newfound skepticism and willingness to reconsider the Seminole
Rock doctrine is gaining momentum in the U.S. Supreme Court. In the Court's 2012
2013 Term, at least three members of the Court explicitly suggested that they were
interested in re evaluating this deference regime. nTus, further examination of the doctrine
is both warranted and timey, especially given the Supreme Court's likey review of the
doctrine.
With that in mind, this Article analyzes how the federal appellate courts have
interpreted and applied the Seminole Rock doctrine, also referred to as "Auer
deference." nTis analysis reveals that there are inconsistencies--to the point of being
characterized as widespread confusion on many aspects of the Seminole Rock
doctrine, including its scope, applicability, and the relevant factors to be weighed when
applying the doctrine.
The analsis further shows that the lack of consistency in the practical application of
the Seminole Rock deference regime cannot be ignored any further, particulary because
agency regulations rather than statutes are the principal way in which legal rights and
obligations are established today. Consequently, the Article concludes that there are
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compelling pragmatic reasons why the Supreme Court should re examine the doctrine to
bring clarity to this important area of federal law.
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INTRODUCTION
For close to seventy years, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has
"lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and judicial criticism."1
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 2 held that
federal courts must defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of its
own regulation unless the interpretation "is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." 3 This doctrine, which recently has been
referred to as "Auer deference," 4 is critically important in administrative law
because agency regulations rather than statutes are the primary way in
which the rights and obligations of private parties are established in the
administrative state today. 5 And because courts regularly review agency
interpretations of regulations, Seminole Rock questions "arise as a matter of
course on a regular basis." 6
Applying such a high level of deference, called by many a "controlling"
deference standard,' is problematic for many reasons. For one, the
1. Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to
Agenc Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 99 (2000); see John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agenc Interpretations ofAgenc Rules, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 612, 696 (1996) ("Seminole Rock deference has not received anything like the attention
devoted to Chevron, its more famous counterpart. But it is no less, and is arguably more,
important to constitutional governance."); see also Kevin 0. Leske, Between Seminole Rock
and a Hard Place: A New Approach to Ageng Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 229 (2013)
(asserting that unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has "gone largely
unexamined"); cf. Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The
Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) ("Although commentators have lavished
attention on the subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of
how to interpret regulations.").
2. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
3. Id. at414.
4. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). It is unknown why the legal
community now refers to it as Auer deference, instead of Seminole Rock deference. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Dcerence: Supreme Court Treatment ofAgenc
Statutory Interpretations fom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GLo. LJ. 1083, 1088 89 n.26 (2008)
(observing and seeking to explain Justice Scalia's use of the term in his dissent in Gonzales V.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (Scalia,J., dissenting)).
5. See Manning, supra note 1, at 614-15 (reasoning that Seminole Rock requires closer
scrutiny as agency rules impact the public's legal rights and obligations more directly than
statutes); see also Decker v. Nw. Envd. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
concurring) (noting that the Seminole Rock doctrine goes "to the heart of administrative law").
6. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
7. As I did in my article, Leske, supra note 1, at 230 & n.3, I will refer to Seminole Rock
deference as "controlling" deference because it conforms to the Court's view that the
agency's "administrative interpretation ... becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; accord Weaver,
supra note 1, at 591 (calling certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock's, "controlling"
ADMImIST TIVE LAW E VIE PPW
application of the Seminole Rock standard can encourage the agency "to
promulgate excessively vague legislative rules" and "leave the more difficult
task of specification to the more flexible and unaccountable process of later
'interpreting' these open-ended regulations." 8 In other words, because the
agency will know that its interpretation of its own vague application will
likely prevail during judicial review, it has no incentive to go through the
notice and comment process of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9
Furthermore, as persuasively argued by Professor John F. Manning in
1996, the current Seminole Rock standard also raises separation of powers
concerns. 10 When a court defers to an administrative agency under Seminole
Rock, the agency has, in a sense, both made the law, via the promulgation of
its regulation, and interpreted that "law," by receiving controlling
deference for its interpretation. This power of "self-interpretation" 11 thus
"contradicts a major premise of our constitutional scheme and of
contemporary separation of powers case law that a fusion of lawmaking
and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties." 12
Practically speaking, as noted by Professor Russell Weaver, the courts
because they are outcome determinative). Other scholars have referred to it as "binding
deference." See Manning, supra note 1, at 617 (discussing the concept of "binding
deference," which requires "a reviewing court to accept an agency's reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous legal texts, even when a court would construe those materials
differently as a matter of first impression").
8. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Placefor a 'Legislative Histogr" ofAgenc Rules,
51 HASTINGS LJ. 255, 290 (1999 2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The
CourtS Deferences-A Foolish Inconsisten, 26 A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, no. 1, Fall
2000, at 10 11 (observing that if an agency is confident that it will receive controlling
deference for its interpretation, it creates "a powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague
regulations, with the thought of creating the operative regulatory substance later through
informal interpretations").
9. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (2012); see Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search ofthe Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1235, 1309 (2007) (stating that "the [Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt agencies to
issue vague regulations through the relatively burdensome notice and comment process"); see
also ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas,J., dissenting) ("It
is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to
do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through
adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.").
10. See Manning, supra note 1, at 638 39, 654, 696 (discussing the relationship between
Chevron and Seminole Rock and the "separation of lawmaking from law-exposition," and
applying a separation of powers analysis to the Seminole Rock decision).
11. See id. at 655 ("The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock removes an
important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency can say
what its own regulations mean (unless the agency's view is plainly erroneous), the agency
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.").
12- Id. at 617.
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"have experienced great difficulty in interpreting regulations and applying
the [Seminole Rock] deference rule to them." 13 Other legal scholars have also
come to the conclusion that the amount of deference given to an agency
when it interprets its own regulation is ambiguous at best. 14
Last, Seminole Rock deference doctrine at least as it is currently
understood appears to be wholly at odds with the APA. 15 As Professor
Robert Anthony has set forth, the requirement that courts defer to an
agency's interpretation of its regulation under Seminole Rock undermines the
parallel requirement in the APA that the courts determine "'the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. ''16 Application of a
controlling deference standard, such as the Seminole Rock standard, thus
conflicts with the APA's goal to give "affected persons ... recourse to an
independent judicial interpreter of the agency's legislative act."' 7  This is
particularly so because, "after all, the agency is often an adverse party" in
any dispute regarding the interpretation of that regulation. 18
But at long last, the Supreme Court has finally taken note of the
doctrinal concerns inherent in the Seminole Rock deference regime.19
13. Weaver, supra note 1, at 589.
14. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1184 ("[Tjhe amount of deference Seminole
Rock requires has always been ambiguous, also contributing to doctrinal confusion for those
lower courts and commentators who follow such matters."); Hickman & Krueger, supra note
9, at 1307 ("The Court has not clearly established the bounds of Seminole Rock
deference .... ).
15. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes 7hey Just Don't Get It, 10
ADMIN. LJ. Am. U. 1, 9 10 (1996) (stating that the intent of § 706 of the APA requiring a
reviewing court to determine the meaning of the trms of an agency action "manifestly was
to arm affected persons with recourse to an independent judicial interpreter of the agency's
legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often an adverse party" and the role of the court
is "a far cry" from pure deference to the agency).
16. Id. at 23 (internal citation omitted).
17. Id. at 9. Professor Anthony also contends that the Seminole Rock doctrine contradicts
the APA's purpose by allowing an "exception for interpretative rules in § 553" because these
rules should be subject to "plenary judicial review." Anthony & Asimow, supra note 8, at 11
(internal citation omitted).
18. Anthony, supra note 15, at 9.
19. Over the years, the Court has expressed some unease over the doctrine, but it is
unlike the attention now given by several of the current justices. For example, over twenty
years ago, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that Seminole Rock deference must not be "a
license for an agency effectively to rewrite a regulation through interpretation." Mullins
Coal Co., Inc. ofVa. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 170 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (referencing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945)). Likewise, Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by three colleagues) suggested that
"agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice
concerning the agency's understanding of the law." Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
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Beginning in 2011, Justice Scalia has made his skepticism of the Seminole
Rock doctrine known to the rest of the Court. In a short concurring
opinion, he first openly opined: "For while I have in the past uncritically
accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity." 20
He then concluded that while the Court had "not been asked to reconsider
Auer in the present case.... [he] will be receptive to doing so" in a future
case. 21
Then, in the Court's 2012 2013 Term, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center, Justice Scalia signaled his continued displeasure with the
vitality of the Seminole Rock doctrine. 22 This time he expressly called for the
rejection of Seminole Rock/Auer deference based on his view that it has "no
principled basis [and] contravenes one of the great rules of separation of
powers [that he] who writes a law must not adjudge its violation." 23
Justice Scalia's unabashed view encouraged ChiefJustice Roberts, joined
by Justice Alito, to write separately to agree that it "may be appropriate to
reconsider that principle in an appropriate case" where "the issue is
properly raised and argued." 24 The ChiefJustice concluded by stating that
practitioners are now "aware that there is some interest in reconsidering
those cases." 25
With the legal community now on clear notice that several members of
the Court are interested in exploring not only the contours of the Seminole
Rock doctrine, but also its continued existence as a deference doctrine, this
Article seeks to contribute to the scarce scholarship on the issue. To do so,
this Article analyzes how the federal appellate courts have interpreted the
doctrine with the goal of highlighting the numerous, significant
inconsistencies among the courts of appeals.26 This analysis shows that in
addition to doctrinal concerns voiced by both scholars and judges, there are
compelling pragmatic reasons that Seminole Rock deference warrants the
Supreme Court's re-examination.
Part I of this Article begins by briefly reviewing the Seminole Rock
doctrine, its theoretical underpinnings, and the Supreme Court's recent
20. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
21. Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
22. Decker v. Nw. Envd. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 1339, 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
"I believe that it is time to do so").
24. Id. at 1338 39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
25. Id. at 1339 (Robert, CJ., concurring).
26. See Leske, supra note 1, at 244 71 (describing the Supreme Court's interpretation
and application of the Seminole Rock doctrine).
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interest in the doctrine. 7 Part II analyzes how the courts of appeals have
applied the various factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has found
important in its Seminole Rock analyses. It then evaluates the trends and the
differences between and among the circuits regarding the application and
interpretation of the doctrine. The Article concludes that the
inconsistencies and splits among the circuit courts raise legitimate
pragmatic concerns, which, in addition to doctrinal considerations, militate
in favor of re-evaluation of the doctrine by the Supreme Court.
I. THE SEMINOLE RocK DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. established a
new standard to govern judicial review of an agency's interpretation of its
own regulation.28 Under Seminole Rock, courts must defer to an agency's
interpretation of its regulation unless it "is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation."29
Before analyzing the interpretation and application of the doctrine by
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, it is worthwhile to review the genesis of the
doctrine, including its doctrinal underpinnings, as well as to explain the
Supreme Court's recent interest in the doctrine. Accordingly, this Part
begins by briefly discussing the Court's ruling in Seminole Rock. Next, it
briefly examines the legal justification for granting controlling deference to
an agency under the doctrine, which was not articulated by the Supreme
Court until nearly fifty years after Seminole Rock was decided. Finally, it
seeks to explain the Supreme Court's recent interest in the doctrine.
A. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.
The Seminole Rock standard under which a court must defer to an
agency's interpretation of its regulation unless the interpretation "is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" was announced in a case
decided in the midst of World War II involving the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, which sought to curb wartime inflation.30 In Seminole
Rock, the Court was required to interpret and apply provisions of Maximum
Price Regulation No. 188, part of a regime that brought price controls to
nearly the entire American economy. 31
A central requirement of the regulation at issue was that "each seller
shall charge no more than the prices which he charged during the selected
27. See Manning, supra note 1, at 638 39, 654, 696.
28. 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
29. Id.
30. Id. at411,413-14.
31. -1d. at 411, 413.
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base period of March 1 to 31, 1942."32 The controversy in the case
involved three parties: Seaboard Air Line Railway (Seaboard), V. P. Loftis
Co., and Seminole Rock & Sand. In October 1941, Seaboard had entered
into a contract with Seminole Rock & Sand to purchase crushed stone
"when called for" at a price of 60 cents per ton, which Seminole Rock &
Sand subsequently delivered to Seaboard in March 1942. 33 In January
1942, Seminole Rock & Sand entered into a contract with V. P. Loftis Co.
to sell crushed stone at a price of $1.50 per ton, as needed. 34 V. P. Loftis
Co., however, had been unable to use or store the stone until August of that
year. 35
Later, after Seminole Rock & Sand began to negotiate additional
contracts for crushed stone with Seaboard for 85 cents and $1.00 per ton,
Chester Bowles, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration,
sought to enjoin Seminole Rock & Sand from selling at a price higher than
60 cents per ton because there had been an actual delivery in March 1942
at that price. 36 Seminole Rock & Sand argued that there must have been
both a charge and a delivery at that price to fix the ceiling price at 60 cents
per ton. 37  Further, because the contract with Seaboard occurred in
October 1941, the outstanding January 1942 contract with V.P. Loftis Co.
calling for a $1.50 per ton should be considered the ceiling price. 38 The
district court ruled that Seminole Rock & Sand had not violated the
Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 because it agreed that $1.50 per ton
was the highest price Seminole Rock & Sand had charged during the
selected base period based on theJanuary 1942 contract. 39 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 4
The principal question for the Supreme Court was therefore whether
Seminole Rock & Sand charged prices exceeding the regulatory maximum
during the period in question. 4' Before it looked to the Administrator's
interpretation of the regulation, the Court found that the regulatory
language would only be probative if it was ambiguous. 42 If there was an
ambiguity, it ruled, "a court must necessarily look to the administrative




36. Id. at 412, 415.
37. Id. at415.
38. Id.
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construction of the regulation. ' 43 And, when a court then determines the
definition of the regulation, it held that "the ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 44
The Court then reviewed the regulation's language and considered the
"administrative construction" of the regulation found in a bulletin issued at
the time the Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 was issued.45 In light of
the ambiguous phrase "highest price charged during March, 1942" and
"the consistent administrative interpretation" set forth in the bulletin
interpreting that phrase, the Court found that the highest price of an actual
delivery during March 1942 established the price ceiling. 46 Therefore, the
Court found that both the district court and circuit court had erred in
finding that $1.50 per ton, rather than 60 cents which Seminole Rock &
Sand had charged for the actual delivery of stone to Seaboard in March
1942 was the "highest price charged during March, 1942.", 47 Thus, the
Court deferred to the agency's interpretation of the regulation and reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals. 48
B. A Very BriefDoctrinal Explanation of Seminole Rock
Looking back, we now see that the Court's decision in Seminole Rock gave
rise to a new administrative law standard that has governed the review of
agencies' interpretations of their own regulations to this day. Surprisingly,
however, when the Court in Seminole Rock held that administrative
interpretation is the determining factor "unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation," it did not explain the basis for this
standard. 49 In fact, it was not until two cases in the early 1990s that the
Court provided its reasoning for establishing the Seminole Rock doctrine.
The first case was Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review




46. Id. at 415, 418. The Court also seemed to place significant weight on the fact that




50. 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking
prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers."). For further background on
Martin, see Leske, supra note 1.
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interpretations was based on the agency's delegated lawmaking powers.
Later, in Paulj v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,51 the Court expanded upon its
reasoning and explained that implicit in Congress's delegation to an agency
is the authority to interpret regulations. And this delegation to agencies, in
turn, is the foundation for giving agencies controlling deference for their
interpretations. 52
Although of enormous significance in determining the proper meaning
of regulatory language, the Supreme Court largely avoided additional
explanation of its controlling deference standard or any discussion in
response to any perceived deficiencies or shortcomings of the doctrine.
That would eventually change, but it would take another several decades
for any further examination to take place. 53 In the meantime, the Supreme
Court and appellate courts began developing various factors to be applied
when considering agency deference under Seminole Rock, without regard to
whether those factors were consistent with the doctrine's underpinnings or
might otherwise be problematic.
C. The Supreme Court's Recent Interest in Seminole Rock
The Supreme Court has been interpreting and applying the Seminole Rock
doctrine on a somewhat regular basis since it established the doctrine in
1945. 5 4 The Court's opinions in these cases have generally shown its
acceptance of the standard, but it has not hesitated to incorporate new
factors or considerations into the Seminole Rock analysis on an ad hoc basis. 55
But it has only been within the past five years that members of the Court
have expressed willingness to re-evaluate the doctrine. And this interest
culminated with an outright statement by ChiefJustice Roberts during the
Court's 2012 2013 Term that there is interest in reconsidering the doctrine
in a future case. 56
The Court's June 2011 decision in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell
51. 501 U.S. 680 (1991). For further background on Pauly, see Leske, supra note 1.
52. Pauly, 501 U.S. at 698 ("As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary's authority
to promulgate interim regulations 'not... more restrictive than' the HEW [Health,
Education, and Welfare] interim regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret
HEW's regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a
reasonable interpretation thereof. From this congressional delegation derives the Secretary's
entilement to judicial deference.").
53. See Leske, supra note 1.
54. For a detailed review of the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the
Seminole Rock doctrine, see Leske, supra note 1, at 248 71.
55. See infra Part II for further discussion on these factors.
56. Decker v. Nw. Envd. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 39 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
concurring).
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Telephone Co. 57 marked the Court's first signal that the Seminole Rock doctrine
was on at least one member of the Court's radar. In a short concurrence,
Justice Scalia highlighted his newfound skepticism toward the Seminole Rock
doctrine. 58 At issue in Talk America was whether local telephone service
providers are required by the Telecommunications Act to offer competitors
use of their transmission facilities at cost-based regulated rates. 59 Because
both the statute and regulations at issue were ambiguous, the Court needed
to "turn to the FCC's [Federal Communications Commission's]
interpretation of its regulations."60  The Court applied the Seminole Rock
standard and deferred to the agency.6 1
In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court stated that the application of
the Seminole Rock doctrine was dispositive: "The FCC as amicus curiae has
advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, and we defer to its
views." 962 Although Justice Scalia had joined the opinion of the Court, he
dedicated a concurring opinion to announce that he was re-thinking the
Seminole Rock doctrine: "For while I have in the past uncritically accepted
that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity."6 3  He
concluded his short concurrence by stating: "We have not been asked to
reconsider Auer in the present case. When we are, I will be receptive to
doing so." 64
The following year, the Court explored the Seminole Rock standard in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.6 5 and ultimately declined to grant the
Department of Labor (DOL) Seminole Rock deference.66  In SmithKline
57. 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
58. See id. at 2265 66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how he would reach the same
holding as the majority without relying on the Seminole Rock doctrine, since "the FCC's
[Federal Communications Commission's] interpretation is the fairest reading of the orders
in question").
59. Id. at 2257.
60. Id. at 2260 61. FCC's interpretation was that facilities must be made available if
they were to be used "to link the incumbent provider's telephone network with the
competitor's network for the mutual exchange of traffic." Id. at 2257.
61. Id. at 2261. The FCC was not a party to the litigation but submitted an amicus
curiae brief. Id.
62. Id. at 2265.
63. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opined that the doctrine
encourages agencies to enact vague regulations, may violate the separation of powers
doctrine, and "frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promots
arbitrary government." Id. He also referred to the Seminole Rock doctrine as "Auer
deference." Id.
64. Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
65. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
66. Id. at 2167 68. To support its decision to withhold agency deference, the Court
cited several past cases, some of which are not even part of the Seminole Rock/Auer line of
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Beecham, the Court was called upon to determine whether DOL's regulation
defining "outside salesman" included pharmaceutical sales
representatives. 67
The Court first discussed the DOL regulations and the agency's
interpretation and then considered whether it should defer to that
interpretation. 68  Although the Court recognized that it usually defers
under Seminole Rock, the Court stated that "this general rule does not apply
in all cases."169 More specifically, it relied upon its previous observation in
Auer that deference might not be appropriate "when there is reason to
suspect that the agency's interpretation 'does not reflect the agency's fair
and considered judgment on the matter in question." ' 70  After analyzing
this issue, the Court declined to give DOL's interpretation deference under
Seminole Rock. 71 And although the Court did not question whether to look to
doctrine, SmithKline Beecham is significant because it is a rare case where the
Court declined to defer under Seminole Rock. 72
Both Talk America and SmithKline Beecham set the stage for the re-
emergence of the Seminole Rock doctrine in two opinions written in the 2013
case of Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center. 73 Given these opinions,
especially ChiefJustice Roberts's concurrence, it seems likely that the Court
will decide to re-evaluate the doctrine in a future case.
In Decker, the Court determined whether the federal Clean Water Act
(CWA) implementing regulations define a discharge into navigable waters
to include stormwater runoff channeled from logging roads. 74 In an amicus
cases. Id. at 2167 (referencing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991) and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)).
67. Id.at2161.
68. Id. at 2166.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). The Court detailed two
instances when an agency's interpretation might not reflect its fair and considered judgment:
"when the agency's interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation," id. (citing Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)), and when an agency's interpretation
appears to be "nothing more than a 'convenient litigating position,"' or a 'post hoc
rationalizatio[n]' advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against
attack." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
71. Id. at 2168 69. The Court found that acceptance of the Department of Labor's
(DOL's) interpretation would not give fair warning to the public and would constitute
"unfair surprise." Id. at 2167.
72. Seeid. at2167 68.
73. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
74. Id. at 1330. A permit for such runoff is necessary if the discharge is "deemed to be
'associated with industrial activity' as those terms are interpreted under the Clean Water
Act (CWA) and the implementing regulations issued by the Environmental Protection
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curiae brief filed in the case, the Government stated that "[tihe EPA
[Environmental Protection Agency] interprets its regulation to exclude the
type of stormwater discharges from logging roads at issue." 75 Applying the
Seminole Rock standard, the Court determined that, because the EPA's view
was a "reasonable interpretation of its own regulation," it would defer to
that interpretation under Seminole Rock. 76 The majority reasoned that, not
only was the "EPA's interpretation H a permissible one," but "there is no
indication that the [EPA's] current view [was] a change from prior practice
or a post hoc justification adopted in response to litigation." 77
Writing separately, Justice Scalia made clear his outright frustration with
the Seminole Rock doctrine by bemoaning that "[e]nough is enough" with
respect to "giving agencies the authority to say what their rules meanH
under the harmless-sounding banner of' Seminole Rock deference. 78 He then
identified many of the criticisms of the doctrine set forth by scholars in
academic literature and by Justices in past decisions while observing that
the Court had never set forth a "persuasive justification" for Seminole Rock
deference. 79 Before addressing the merits of the case, he concluded his
criticism of the Seminole Rock doctrine as follows: "however great may be the
efficiency gains derived from Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot justify
a rule that not only has no principled basis but contravenes one of the great
rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation." 80
But even apart from Justice Scalia's vehement attack on the Seminole Rock
doctrine, another significant development was the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Roberts, which was joined by Justice Alito. Dedicated to
highlighting the Court's interest in the Seminole Rock line of cases, the
Agency (EPA). Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(g) (2012)). In turn, an EPA regulation
defines "the term 'associated with industrial activity' to cover only discharges 'from any
conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related
to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant."' Id.
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2012)).
75. Id. at 1331.
76. Id. (citingAuer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
77. Id. at 13293 0, 1337 (citing SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 67).
78. Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
distinguished this case from Talk America, where the "agency's interpretation of the rule was
also the fairest one, and no party had asked [the Court] to reconsider." Id. Here, he
argued, the application of the Seminole Rock doctrine "ma [de] the difference." Id.
79. Id. at 1340 41 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referencing
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
Anthony, supra note 15, at 11 12, and Manning, supra note 1).
80. Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
would have determined a regulation's meaning by applying "familiar tools of textual
interpretation," such as implementing the fairest reading of the regulations. Id.
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opinion acknowledged that Justice Scalia's opinion had raised "serious
questions about the principle set forth" in Seminole Rock and Auer.81 The
opinion also acknowledged the view that the doctrine goes "to the heart of
administrative law" and that Seminole Rock issues "arise as a matter of course
on a regular basis." 82
The Chief Justice signaled that although "[i]t may be appropriate to
reconsider that principle in an appropriate case," the present case was not
appropriate due to the lack of fully developed arguments by the parties on
the doctrine. 83 He concluded by specifically announcing his intent to make
the legal bar "aware that there is some interest in reconsidering" Seminole
Rock and Auer.84
All told, the Justices' pronouncements in Decker, as well as in Talk America
and SmithKline Beecham, unmistakably demonstrate that it is simply a matter
of time before the Court will accept a case for review with the goal of re-
evaluating the Seminole Rock doctrine. 85  With that in mind, the
consideration of the doctrine by the various federal courts of appeals can
serve several important purposes. First, the analysis could provide a
valuable point of reference for the Supreme Court as to how the Seminole
Rock doctrine is being interpreted and applied by federal courts in practice,
including any major areas of disagreement. Next, to the extent the conflicts
are significant, the analysis could provide additional support for the need to
re-examine Seminole Rock for pragmatic, rather than doctrinal, reasons as
soon as possible.
II. SPLITS IN THE ROCK
A. Introduction
Despite the close to seven decades that the Seminole Rock doctrine has
functioned in our jurisprudence, the judges in the courts of appeals and the
81. Id. at 1338 (Roberts, CJ., concurring) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410 (1945) and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
82. Id. at 1339 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
83. Id. at 1338 39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring) (stating he "would await a case in which
the issue is properly raised and argued").
84. Id. at 1339 (Robert, CJ., concurring).
85. The Court has already agreed to hear a consolidated case that could slightly alter
the Seminole Rock analysis. See Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir.
2013), cet. granted sub nom. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 82 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S.June 16,
2014) (Nos. 13 1041 & 13 1052) (determining whether a federal agency must engage in
notice-and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an intrpretive rule that
articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation). The precise contours and impact of
this case, however, remain to be seen and are beyond the scope of this Article except to note
that it could impact part of the Seminole Rock analysis. See discussion infra Part II.
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justices of the Supreme Court have shown a similar restraint, or disinterest
perhaps, in analyzing the doctrine critically. While every circuit has
engaged in an analysis of the doctrine in the context of a specific case, there
are very few cases where a judge has gone beyond questioning the result of
a particular application of the doctrine. Moreover, unlike the recent
criticism by Justice Scalia, extensive research revealed no so-called
"crusaders" at the court of appeals level who explicitly advocate a complete
re-evaluation of the doctrine or dispensing with the doctrine altogether.
With respect to the interpretation of the Seminole Rock doctrine by the
circuit courts, five key observations can be made. First, it is evident that,
like the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence 86 on the Seminole Rock doctrine,
the courts of appeals have undertaken an evaluation of whether to defer
that is much more robust than the standard seems to call for. Second, also
like the opinions of the Supreme Court,87 substantial inconsistency, even
confusion, exists with respect to how courts interpret and apply the
standard. Third, the enhanced analyses by the courts of appeals, for the
most part, successfully incorporate many of the factors that the Supreme
Court identified and grafted onto its own Seminole Rock analysis over the past
sixty-nine years. But they have done so on an ad hoc basis.
Fourth, although some of these inconsistencies among the interpretations
of the doctrine can be attributed to the uniqueness of the factual
circumstances of each case, panels of several circuits have interpreted the
doctrine in a way that squarely conflicts with both Supreme Court
precedent and other circuit courts' decisions. Fifth, and finally, based on
this confusion, inconsistency, and outright conflict over the contours of the
Seminole Rock doctrine, Supreme Court review is certainly warranted to re-
visit the doctrine, particularly given the pragmatic concerns it raises.
Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court's own inconsistent formulation
and interpretation of the contours of the Seminole Rock doctrine for the past
sixty-nine years, one goal of this Part is to explain how the circuits interpret
and apply the doctrine. Relatedly, given the Supreme Court's recent
interest in re-evaluating the doctrine, another goal of this Part is to facilitate
the Court's consideration of a future case involving the doctrine. As such,
this Part seeks to provide additional insight and to show that the courts of
appeals are split on their actual understanding of how (e.g., what factors
must be considered) to apply the doctrine, as well as on the impact of the
Supreme Court's subsequent cases expounding the Seminole Rock standard.
86. Leske, supra note 1, at 235.
87. Id.
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B. Differences and Inconsistencies Among the Courts of Appeals
As set forth above, the circuits diverge as to which of the Supreme
Court's Seminole Rock factors they incorporate into their analysis. Thus, the
circuit courts are just as inconsistent as the Supreme Court in interpreting
and applying the Seminole Rock doctrine. Consequently, the circuits vary as
to what formulation of the standard they employ.
Accordingly, the most straightforward way to discuss and highlight the
key disparities and disagreements among the courts of appeals is through
consideration of the factors either explicitly or implicitly found by the
Supreme Court to be important to its Seminole Rock inquiry. 88 For example,
these factors, which appear on an ad hoc and overlapping basis, include (1)
whether the regulation being interpreted is ambiguous, which prevents a
subsequent interpretation of that regulation from creating "de facto" a new
regulation; (2) whether the agency had stated its intent when the regulation
at issue was promulgated and relatedly whether acceptance of the agency's
interpretation would result in "unfair surprise"; (3) whether the agency's
interpretation of its regulation is consistent with prior interpretations and
reflects the agency's "fair and considered" judgment on the issue; (4)
whether the regulation being interpreted merely repeats statutory language;
(5) whether the agency interpretation appears in a format that carries the
force of law; and, (6) whether the agency has a specialized expertise in the
matter in question. These factors provide the basis for the discussion
below.
1. Whether the Regulation Being Interpreted is Ambiguous, which Prevents a
Subsequent Interpretation of that Regulation from Creating 'De Facto" a New
Regulation
It should be well settled that the Seminole Rock standard should only be
applied if the regulation in question is ambiguous because accepting an
interpretation of an unambiguous regulation would allow the agency to
create "de facto" a new regulation. This feature of the doctrine was
established in the Supreme Court's original decision in Seminole Rock.
Immediately before the Court established the Seminole Rock standard that
the agency's interpretation must be accepted unless "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation," it stated that the agency's interpretation
of the regulation was only relevant "if the meaning of the words used [in
the regulation was] in doubt.189 Although this predicate to the application
88. These factors also provide the basis for a new approach to the Seminole Rock analysis
proposed in Leske, supra note 1, at 235.
89. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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of the standard had been overlooked over the years, the Supreme Court in
Christensen v. Harris County reaffirmed that Seminole Rock "deference is
warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous." 90
The courts of appeals, for the most part, recognize that the Seminole Rock
doctrine only applies when an agency is interpreting an ambiguous
regulation. They do, however, differ on how they effectuate this part of the
analysis. Some circuits, such as the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit,
simply state the standard as requiring that the regulation be ambiguous
without much elaboration beyond quoting or paraphrasing the Supreme
Court's holding.9'
The Second Circuit's opinions in Mullins v. City of New York, 92 Yourman v.
Giuliani,93 Linares Huarcaya v. Mukasey, 94 and M. Fortunoff of Westbuy Corp. v.
Peerless Insurance Co. illustrate this point. 95 For example, in Mullins, the panel
explicitly found that "[d] eference to an agency's interpretation is owed only
when the regulation at issue is ambiguous," 96 and in Linares Huarcaya,
another panel noted that "Auer deference, like Chevron deference, 'is
warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous."' 97
Similarly, the panels in both M. Fortunoff of Westbuy Corp.98 and Yourman v.
Giuliani99 cited the same language from Christensen.
Panels in some circuits, such as the Federal, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,
however, are more formal and employ a two-step test, like the one
established in Chevron. 100 For example, in Gose v. U.S. Postal Service, the
90. Christensen v. Harris Cny., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
91. See, e.g., Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2011); Linares
Huarcaya v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2008); Ky. Waterways Alliance v.
Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 474 75 (6th Cir. 2008); Yourman v. Giuliani, 229 F.3d 124, 128 (2d
Cir. 2000); see also Takacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., 246 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588) ('"[D]eference [to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation] is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous."').
92. Mullins, 653 F.3d at 113.
93. fourman, 229 F.3d at 128.
94. Linares Huarcaya, 550 F.3d at 229.
95. M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 432 F.3d 127, 139 (2d Cir.
2005).
96. Mullins, 653 F.3d at 113 (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).
97. Linares Huarcaya, 550 F.3d at 229 (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).
98. M. Fortunoff oflWestbury Corp., 432 F.3d at 139 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588)
' Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.').
99. Yourman v. Giuliani, 229 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting the same language
from Christensen).
100. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 43
(1984); see, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 193 94 (4th
Cir. 2009) (citations omited) (stating that "we must first determine whether the regulation
itself is unambiguous; if so, its plain language controls" and "[i] f
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Federal Circuit court explained that the Seminole Rock analysis involved
separate inquiries as to whether the agency's interpretation applied in a
particular case was directed to "regulatory language that is unclear" and
then, if so, whether such interpretation was "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." 101 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, in United
States v. Deaton, before deferring under Seminole Rock, noted that it "first
decide[s] whether the regulation is ambiguous."' 1 2  Finally, the Fifth
Circuit, in Belt v. EmCare, Inc., explained that it "employ[s] a similar two-
step" process, like Chevron, first determining whether the language of the
regulation is ambiguous, and second granting deference if the
interpretation is not inconsistent or plainly in error. 103
Relatedly, as warned by the Supreme Court in Christensen, if a court
defers under Seminole Rock to an unambiguous regulation, it would "permit
the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create defacto a
new regulation." 104 The various courts of appeals are relatively uniform in
recognizing and enforcing this facet of the Seminole Rock standard to ensure
that this does not occur, with the best examples being in the Sixth
Circuit.10 5 For example, in a 2012 case, Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, a
panel of the Sixth Circuit made clear that it "afford[s] an agency's
interpretation no deference ... if the language of the regulation is
unambiguous, for doing so would 'permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create defacto a new regulation."' 106 Similarly,
in Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. johnson, the Sixth Circuit highlighted that
"'deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is
ambiguous.' 107 Accordingly, it explained, the consequences were clear if it
ignored the plain text: "If the language of the regulation is clear, then '[t] o
defer to the agency's [contrary] position would be to permit the agency,
under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create a de facto new
ambiguous,... Auer/Seminole Rock deference is applied").
101. 451 F.3d 831,839 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
102. 332 F.3d 698, 710 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).
103. Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 40708 (5th Cir. 2006).
104. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
105. See Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus.
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 140 (lst Cir. 2013); Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301,
306 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588) (rejecting arguments that the
interpretation by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) would effectively constitute a ..de
facto new regulation,' thereby removing it from the scope of Auer").
106. Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 740 41 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).
107. Ky. Waterways Alliance v.Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing and
quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588).
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regulation."' 108
Thus, there are these differences among the circuits on how courts
articulate and apply Seminole Rock's foundational requirement that the
regulation be ambiguous. The Court may therefore be well-advised to
make clear that Seminole Rock analysis entails a separate and initial analysis
as to whether the regulation at issue is ambiguous, such as re-formulating
the Seminole Rock analysis to include a more formal two-step test, as it has
created under the Chevron doctrine. 109 Such a framework would help ensure
that Seminole Rock doctrine could not be used by agencies to create new
regulations de facto.
2. Whether the Agency had Stated its Intent when the Regulation at Issue was
Promulgated, and Related@y Whether Acceptance of the Agency's Interpretation would
Result in "Unfair Surprise"
In 1988, in Gardebring v. jenkins,' ° and then again six years later in
Thomas jefferson University v. Shalala,"'1 the Supreme Court added a new
factor to the Seminole Rock deference analysis. "12 It found that deference was
required "unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's
plain language or by other indications of the Secretay's intent at the time of the
regulation's promulgation."" 3 One principle behind looking to the intent when
the regulation was first promulgated is that the agency should be held to its
expressed interpretation when the regulation underwent the notice and
comment process under the APA. For example, looking to whether the
agency had declared an intent concerning a regulation, such as in a
preamble, ensures that the public can then rely upon that interpretation to
govern its future conduct. Thus, the incorporation of an analysis of the
agency's stated intent in deciding whether to defer helps to ensure this
reliance is effectuated and also avoids "unfair surprise" to parties. "14 This is
108. Id. at 474 75 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588); see also Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 703 F.3d 1303, 1309 (1 th Cir. 2013) (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588)
('"Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous,"' and
that deference cannot be used to "shield an agency's attempt 'to overcome the regulation's
obvious meaning."').
109. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 43
(1984); see Leske, supra note 1, at 275 76.
110. 485U.S.415,430 (1988).
111. 512 U.S. 504,515 (1994).
112. See Leske, supra note 1, at 253 57 (discussing how the Court in Gardebring and
Thomas Jellerson added consideration of the agency's original intent in promulgating a
regulation as a factor in deciding whether to grant the agency Seminole Rock deference).
113. Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added).
114. See Leske, supra note 1, at 277 78 (discussing why this factor should be required in
the proposed new test for the Seminole Rock standard).
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a related factor that the Supreme Court looks to in determining whether to
defer under Seminole Rock.
The intent factor, however, has not been commonly found by the circuits
to be a mandatory element of the Seminole Rock analysis even though it
"most closely approximates the Supreme Court's announced guidance.""15
However, panels in many of the circuits, such as the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits have, at one time or another,
looked at whether the agency expressed an intent at the time it
promulgated the regulation in question, especially if that inquiry impacted
whether acceptance of a new agency interpretation would result in "unfair
surprise." 116
For example, the Third Circuit, in Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital
Partners III L.P., analyzed the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC's) interpretation of a regulation involving derivative securities and
short-swing trading." 7  In performing the Seminole Rock analysis, it noted
that "[p] articular weight is given to agency interpretations made at the time
the regulations are promulgated.""118  And in deferring to SEC's
interpretation, it placed significant weight on the fact that the agency
declared its view "[i] n the release announcing the new regulations" and had
thus already "anticipatedH and rejected" the argument made by the
defendant in the case at bar. "19
The Fourth Circuit looked to whether the agency had expressed a
contrary intent at the time when the regulations in question were issued in
Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. ' 20 There, the original panel granted a petition
for rehearing that had been supported by DOL. In rejecting DOL's
interpretation of the regulation promulgated under the Family and Medical
115. Noah, supra note 8, at 291 92.
116. See, e.g., Sw. Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 718
F.3d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.
2156, 2169 (2012)); Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.3d 677, 684 (10th
Cir. 2010); Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas
Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512); Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3d 1259,
1273 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing 7homasJefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512); Rucker v. Lee Holding
Co., 471 F.3d 6, 7 8 (lst Cir. 2006) (discussed infia notes 152 158 and accompanying text);
Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Gardebring, 485 U.S. at
430) (explaining how "evidence that the proffered interpretation runs contrary to the intent
of the agency at the time of enactment of the regulation ... detracts from the deference we
owe to that interpretation"); United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 578 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing 7homasyJefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512).
117. Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 315 16
(3d Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 315 (citing Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430).
119. Id.
120. Progress Eneg, Inc., 493 F.3d at 461.
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Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), the court placed heavy weight on the fact that
the proffered interpretation was "inconsistent with what the DOL said it
intended the regulation to mean at the time it was promulgated." 121 Citing
Thomas Jefferson University, the court held that it does "not defer to an
agency's interpretation if 'an alternative reading is compelled
by ... indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's
promulgation." 122
In Gose v. US. Postal Service, the Federal Circuit was called upon to
determine whether a Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) post was a "public
place" within a U.S. postal regulation prohibiting the consumption of
intoxicating beverages while in uniform. 123 After citing the Seminole Rock
standard, the court noted that deference is even broader than it is under
Chevron. 124 It included in its analysis the principle that "[j]ust as an agency's
inconsistent interpretation of its regulation detracts from the deference we
owe to that interpretation, so does evidence that the proffered
interpretation runs contrary to the intent of the agency at the time of
enactment of the regulation."1 25 Thus, although not dispositive, a contrary
intent is a factor that weighed against granting Seminole Rock deference.
In the First Circuit, the prime, and most recent, example of the related
concern that an interpretation does not result in an unfair surprise
regardless of whether the agency had announced its intent previously is its
2013 decision in Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry Pension Fund.126 Here, Sun Funds, a private equity fund,
had sought a declaratory judgment from the district court that it was not
subject to "withdrawal liability" under the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA). 127 In rejecting the federal agency's
interpretation of a regulation defining the term "trade or business" that had
been set forth in an appeals letter, the district court found that this
interpretation "was owed deference only to the extent it could persuade." 128
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). The
Sixth Circuit also recognized this factor in United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d
569, 578 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Thomas Jerson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512).
123. Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 837 (stating it defers "even more broadly to an agency's interpretations of its
own regulations than to its interpretation of statues, because the agency, as the promulgator
of the regulation, is particularly well suited to speak to its original intent in adopting the
regulation").
125. Id. at 838.
126. 724 F.3d 129 (lst Cir. 2013).
127. Id. at 137.
128. Id. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) is
administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., a wholly owned United States
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On appeal, the agency argued that its letter should have received Seminole
Rock deference. 12 9 In declining to apply the doctrine, the court found that
"such deference is inappropriate where significant monetary liability would
be imposed on a party for conduct that took place at a time when that party
lacked fair notice of the interpretation at issue." 130 This determination was
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent announcement in SmithKline
Beecham, that "'where, as here, an agency's announcement of its
interpretation is preceded by a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction,
the potential for unfair surprise is acute."" 131
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has addressed the unfair surprise factor in two
recent cases. In Southwest Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, the court deferred to an interpretation by the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) of certain Medicare regulations. 132
The court recognized the limits of the Seminole Rock doctrine: "we have
declined to extend deference under Auer to an agency's interpretation [that]
is a novel litigating position wholly unsupported by regulations, ruling, or
administrative practice.'133 But because the agency had not applied the
regulation "in a manner inconsistent with its proffered interpretation," it
deferred to the agency. 134  Likewise, it recognized that Seminole Rock
deference could be withheld "when doing so would impose liability" or
constitutes "unfair surprise," but did not find that was the case here. 135
In another case decided in 2013, a panel of the Fifth Circuit declined to
defer to an agency's interpretation of its own interpretive manual after a
careful analysis under Seminole Rock based primarily on the unfair surprise
factor. In Elgin Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. US. Department of Health &
Human Services, the court properly noted that "'opinion letters, handbooks
and other published declarations of an agency's views, including amicus
briefs, are authoritative sources of the agency's interpretation of its own
government corporation, which is modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and is authorized to promulgate regulations under the MPPAA. Id. at 133 n.2.
129. Id. at 140.
130. Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167
(2012)).
131. Id. at 140 41 (quoting SmithKlineBeecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168).
132. Sw. Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 718 F.3d
436, 442 (5th Cir. 2013).
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citations omitted) (.'Petitioners invoke the [agency's] interpretation of
ambiguous regulations to impose potentially massive liability on respondent for conduct that
occurred well before that interpretation was announced.'... '[A]s long as interpretive
changes create no unfair surprise ... the change in interpretation alone presents no separate
ground for disregarding the [agency's] present interpretation.'").
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regulations." ' 1 6 But it declined to follow Seminole Rock because accepting
the agency's interpretation would mean "deferring to its interpretation of its
manual interpreting its interpretive regulation," something for which it had
Cnever granted such extraordinary deference to an agency." 137 To do so, in
the court's view, would "unfairly surprise the sanctioned party and seriously
undermine the principle that agencies should provide regulated parties fair
warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires." 138 Because
deference in these situations "'frustrates the notice and predictability
purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government,"' the court
refused to defer. 139
The Tenth Circuit was also well aware of the unfair surprise factor in
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., where the defendant had been sued
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for failing to
accommodate a potential employee's religious belief that required wearing
a headscarf. 140 During the interview process, the potential employee never
stated a need to wear her headscarf due to her religious beliefs.141 Thus, a
question arose concerning the interpretation of a regulation that required
employers to make certain religious accommodations upon "notification" of
the employee's need. 142
In its careful approach to determining whether to defer under Seminole
Rock, the court stressed the "importance of safeguarding the principle that
agencies should provide regulated parties fair warning of the conduct [a
regulation] prohibits or requires."' 143  It quoted at length the Supreme
Court in SmithKline Beecham:
It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an
agency's interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another
to require regulated parties to divine the agency's interpretations in advance
or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the
first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference. 144
The court found EEOC had not given adequate notice or fair warning and
136. Elgin Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 718 F.3d
488, 493 (5th Cir. 2013).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 494 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
140. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1110 11 (10th Cir.
2013).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 111 11,1114.
143. Id. at 1137 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012)).
144. Id. at 1138 (quoting SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168).
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declined to defer to the agency's interpretation. 145
In sum, although the circuits correctly demonstrate a core concern that
parties receive fair warning of an agency interpretation, they do not all
analyze whether the agency had expressed its intent concerning the
meaning of the regulation at the time it was first promulgated. Certain
panels have held that Seminole Rock deference is not appropriate when the
agency has declared a contrary intent, 146 while others merely view it as
"evidence" to consider in their analysis. 147 And because the requirement
comes directly from the Court's decision in Gardebring v. jenkins,148 panels
that do not analyze this factor are failing to follow Supreme Court
precedent. With that said, the Supreme Court's own inconsistency in
analyzing the factor in subsequent cases has likely contributed to this
confusion. 149
3. Whether the Agency's Interpretation of its Regulation is Consistent with Prior
Interpretations and Reflects the Agency" "Fair and Reasoned Judgment"
In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Supreme Court found that
Seminole Rock deference might not be appropriate "when the agency's
interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation." 150 And in other cases,
the Court has found that "the consistency of an agency's position is a factor
in assessing the weight that position is due." 151 A court's consideration of
an agency's consistency before granting deference under Seminole Rock also
reinforces related and overlapping principles articulated by the Court that
145. Id. at 1139 (citations omitted).
146. See, e.g., Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)) (stating that the court does
"not defer to an agency's interpretation if 'an alternative reading is compelled
by ... indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation').
147. Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that
"evidence that the proffered interpretation runs contrary to the intent of the agency at the
time of enactment of the regulation" takes away from deference to the agency's
interpretation); see also Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d
312, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that "particular weight" is accorded to an agency's
interpretation at the time of promulgation).
148. 485 U.S. 415 (1988).
149. See Leske, supra note 1, at 257 60, 277 78 (discussing the factor's disappearance in
subsequent cases and why this factor should be required in the proposed new test for the
Seminole Rock standard).
150. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012); Thomas
Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("j]t is true that an
agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is
entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view .....
151. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993).
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an interpretation reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment and not
be a post hoc rationalization.
These related concerns are the most widely cited by the circuits in the
Seminole Rock analysis, and accordingly, these factors are the most widely
accepted and least controversial aspect of the Seminole Rock inquiry
performed by the circuits. With that said, the D.C. Circuit and Seventh
Circuit stand alone in suggesting an agency must also follow the provisions
in the APA if the agency sets forth an inconsistent interpretation.
Therefore, there is wide-spread inconsistency on the precise contours of
these factors, such as whether they are separate factors, or encompass or
subsume each other. Conflicts also exist as to what role, if any, the APA
plays in the inquiry.
For example, in the First Circuit case of Rucker v. Lee Holding Co., Rucker
sued his previous employer alleging that he had been improperly
terminated under the FMLA. 152  The employee had worked for a car
dealership for five years but then left for five years before returning again as
an employee.153 Seven months later, Rucker filed for medical leave under
the FMLA. 154 DOL interpreted its ambiguous regulation to allow non-
consecutive terms of employment to count toward the twelve-month
requirement.155 Although DOL presented its view in an amicus brief filed
in the case, it also had expressed this interpretation in the preamble
published in the Federal Register. 156 Combining the factors, the court
found that Seminole Rock deference was appropriate because DOL's
interpretation in the amicus brief was "consistently held."157 The court
held that it was in accord with the language of the preamble, and therefore,
there was "no risk here that the agency's view is any sort of 'post hoc
rationalization,' rather than 'the agency's fair and considered
judgment."' 158
In 2011, in another First Circuit case, the court in Massachusetts v. Sebelius
quoted the Seminole Rock standard as set forth in Auer.159 It made clear that
"[d] eference is not given... to a 'post hoc rationalizatio [n] advanced by an
agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack' or when there is
reason to 'suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair
152. 471 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2006).
153. Jd. at7 8.
154. Jd. at 8.
155. Id.
156. -1d. at 12.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 13.
159. Massachusetts v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
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and considered judgment on the matter in question.'" 160 When performing
the Seminole Rock analysis, the panel combined the inquiry of these two
factors, noting that "it is true that an agency's interpretation of its
regulation may not be entitled to deference if it is merely a post hoc
rationalization for past agency action rather than the agency's fair and
considered judgment on the issue." 16
The Second Circuit has similarly analyzed the consistency of an agency's
interpretation to help it determine whether an agency's interpretation was a
post hoc rationalization. For example, in Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,
the court noted "the consistency of the EPA's interpretation" of the
regulation at issue, which relied on the Supreme Court's view in Auer that
an agency's consistent interpretation demonstrates it was not made merely
to defend the agency after the onset of litigation. 16 2
The Federal Circuit, in Gose v. US. Postal Service, highlighted the
importance of the consistency factor, but also cited to the related post hoc
rationalization and fair and reasoned judgment language found in the
Supreme Court case law. 16 3  As discussed above, the court had to
determine whether a VFW post was a "public place" under a U.S. postal
regulation.16 4 After citing the Seminole Rock standard, the court noted that
deference is even broader than it is under Chevron. 6 5 It then analyzed a
number of considerations such as the fact that "[d]eference is particularly
appropriate when the agency interpretation has been consistently
160. Id. at 30 (alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
161. Id. at 34; see also Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738 F.3d 432, 452 (1st
Cir. 2013) (rejecting the argument that Seminole Rock deference was not appropriate under
the Supreme Court's recent holding in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. because the
agency's interpretation "was inconsistent with past agency practice").
162. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 208 (2d Cir. 2009) (citingAuer,
519 U.S. at 462); see also Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct.
2254, 2261 (2011)) (incorporating the Supreme Court's inquiry as to whether "there is any
other reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question"); Meineker v. Hoyt Cinemas Corp., 69 F.
App'x 19, 24 26 (2d Cir. 2003) (directing district court on remand to consider whether the
government's interpretation represented a "fair and considered judgment" consistent with
the history of the regulation, or rather whether it had proffered a post hoc rationalization);
Callaway v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 231 F.3d 106, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to
defer where it was evident that the agency's interpretation was a "post-hoc rationalizatio [n]"
in order to defend the agency's past action).
163. Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 837 38 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
164. Id. at 834; discussed supra notes 123 125.
165. Id. at 837 (stating it defers "even more broadly to an agency's interpretations of its
own regulations than to its interpretation of statutes," because the regulating agency "is
particularly well suited to speak to its original intent in adopting the regulation").
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applied"' 166 and conversely, that "an agency's interpretation of a statute or
regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is entitled to considerably
less deference than a consistently held agency view." 167 It then also laid out
the various Supreme Court cases that stand for the proposition that an
agency position cannot amount to a "convenient litigating position" or post
hoc rationalization. 168 But the court ultimately recognized the standard for
Seminole Rock deference "is often easily met," quoting Auer's language that
even agency interpretations set forth in legal briefs warrant respect because
"'there is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation ... does not
reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question."' 169
The consistency and considered judgment factors appear as separate
factors in Eighth Circuit cases. One example is Fast v. Applebee's International,
Inc., in which a petition for rehearing en banc was denied, but four judges
would have granted the petition. 70 After analyzing the "anti-parroting"
exception, 171 which will be discussed below, the unanimous court employed
a straightforward analysis of the Seminole Rock standard by noting that the
"Supreme Court has accorded Auer deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous regulations with regular frequency in recent years."172 It noted
the occasions when deference is generally appropriate, such as when the
agency's stated position "was consistent with its past views," and even
where an agency's interpretation has changed over time, the panel accepted
that deference would be appropriate "where there was simply no reason to
suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the agency's fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question."17
For its part, the Ninth Circuit has construed the Court's fair and
considered judgment factor as specifically including a consideration of the
consistency of the agency's interpretation, whether the interpretation
appears to be a convenient litigation position, and whether the
interpretation is a post hoc rationalization. In 2013, in Independent Training
& Apprenticeship Program v. California Department of Industrial Relations, a panel
performed an in-depth analysis of the Seminole Rock standard. 174 At issue
166. Id.
167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504,515 (1994)).
168. Id. at 838 (citations omitted).
169. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
170. 638 F.3d 872, 872 (8th Cir. 2011).
171. See infra Part II.B.4.
172. Fast, 638 F.3d at 878.
173. Id. at 878 79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
174. 730 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013).
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was a new interpretation by DOL of a federal apprenticeship regulation. 175
Although the court stated Seminole Rock deference was appropriate unless the
interpretation was "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,"'
it would also decline to defer if "'there is reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on
the matter in question.'"17
The panel then elucidated circumstances when agency interpretation
might be suspect by citing a 2012 en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit:
Indicia of inadequate consideration include conflicts between the agency's
current and previous interpretations; signs that the agency's interpretation
amounts to no more than a convenient litigating position; or an appearance
that the agency's interpretation is no more than a post hoc rationalization
advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against
attack. 177
Based on these factors, it declined to defer under Seminole Rock to the
newly minted DOL interpretation that had "pull[ed] the rug out from
under litigants that have relied on a long-established, prior interpretation of
a regulation." 178 Proceeding otherwise, it stated, "would validate the
criticism that Auer enables agencies to 'promulgate vague and open-ended
regulations that they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby frustrating
the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking.'" 179
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has construed the fair and considered
judgment factor to include the others. In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc., the court noted that Seminole Rock "'deference is likewise unwarranted
when there is reason to suspect that the agency's interpretation does not
reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question." ' 180  According to the panel, "'This might occur when the
agency's interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation, or when it
appears that the interpretation is nothing more than a convenient litigating
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1034.
177. Id. In addition, it included the consideration that Seminole Rock deference should not
be given in circumstances "when to do so 'would seriously undermine the principle that
agencies should provide regulated parties fair warning of the conduct a regulation prohibits
or requires."' Id. at 1034-35 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.
2156, 2167 (2012)). This reinforced the principle noted by the Supreme Court in SmithKline
Beecham, that Seminole Rock deference is "unsuitable when such deference would result in
'unfair surprise' to one of the litigants." Id. at 1035.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168).
180. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1137 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 62 (1997)).
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position."' 181
In the Eleventh Circuit's 2011 case of Ramos Barrientos v. Bland, however,
the panel addressed these factors collectively. 182 In Ramos, the court was
called upon to determine the meaning of a regulation involving "wage
credits" promulgated under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by
DOL. 183 In assessing DOL's interpretation, which had been submitted in
an amicus brief, the court found that DOL's interpretation was controlling
unless "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'1 84 It then
made clear that it was "irrelevant" that DOL's interpretation was presented
in a legal brief because it found that it was "in no sense a post hoc
rationalizatio[n] advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency
action against attack."1 85 It also found that the facts in the case revealed
that there did not appear to be "any other reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the [Secretary's] fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question."' 186 Thus, it appears that the court
views these as separate factors.
Despite the cases demonstrating most of the circuits' usages of the
consistency factors, as well as the related fair and reasoned and post hoc
rationalization factors to determine whether to defer under Seminole Rock,
there have been panels in at least two circuits that have cited an additional
reason for why an inconsistent interpretation might not receive Seminole Rock
deference. These circuits have found that the requirements set forth in the
APA bear on the inquiry on whether to defer. In this respect, these courts
conflict with other circuits, as well as the Supreme Court's current
interpretation of the doctrine.
For example, the D.C. Circuit has sought to resolve the tension
commentators have outlined that exists between the Seminole Rock standard
and the APA.187 Although it has not cited the Seminole Rock doctrine, the
circuit has in a sense abandoned giving Seminole Rock deference in situations
where an agency has changed its interpretation by requiring that an agency
adhere to the notice and comment procedures if it wants to change that
interpretation. 188 In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P. and its
progeny, the court established the rule that although an agency may issue
181. Id. (quotingAuer, 519 U.S. at461 62).
182. Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 590 ( lith Cir. 2011).
183. Jd. at 596.
184. Id. (citingAuer, 519 U.S. at461).
185. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citingAuer, 519 U.S. at 462).
186. Id. (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2263 (2011) and
Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (inwrnal quotation marks omitted).
187. See supra notes 9 18 and accompanying text.
188. See Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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an initial interpretative rule without going through notice and comment,
"[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change
that interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself. through
the process of notice and comment rulemaking." 89 Although this holding
has stood in conflict for more than fifteen years with many other circuit
courts, 19 the Supreme Court has recently decided to determine whether
the D.C. Circuit is correct in its view. 191
The Seventh Circuit has also identified this conflict between the APA
and the Seminole Rock doctrine. In Exelon Generation Co., LLC v. Local 15,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL CIO, the court distinguished
Seminole Rock, and declined to defer under Seminole Rock to an industry-
prepared document that had been approved by staff at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). 192 In the opinion, it highlighted specific
factors to justify why deference was not appropriate. 193 The court reviewed
whether labor arbitrators deciding grievances for unionized nuclear power
plant employees who had been denied "unescorted access" privileges were
permitted to review the "access denial decisions" as well as to "order
unescorted access as a remedy for a wrongful denial." 194 Although from
1991 2009, NRC had allowed such powers, its in-depth revisions of
nuclear power security requirements after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, arguably, changed the arbitral review policy. '95
Following the issuance of the new regulations concerning nuclear power
plant security requirements, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), a private
organization of nuclear power operators, updated a guidance document to
189. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
190. Excluding the Fifth Circuit. See Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th
Cir. 2001).
191. See supra note 85; Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 12, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass'n, Nos. 13 1041 & 13 1052 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 20, 2014), 2014 WL 4101228, at *12
(citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978)) (arguing against the D.C. Circuit's view because the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 559,
established the "'maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking'). Section 553 of the APA
establishes notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, but exempts "interpretative rules,"
among others, from the notice and comment requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
Although it is impossible to predict whether the Court will address the Seminole Rock doctrine
in its opinion, the Brief for the United States, as petitioners, did not mention the doctrine.
See Brief for the Federal Petitioners, Perez, 2014 WL 4101228.
192. Exelon Generation Co. v. Local 15, Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 676
F.3d 566, 576 (7th Cir. 2012).
193. Seeid.at576 78.
194. Id. at 568.
195. Id. (finding that "the new language was at best ambiguous as to whether the
Commission had changed its policy to prohibit arbitral review").
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assist members to implement the amended regulation. 196 Significantly, the
document, titled NEI 03 01 (Revision 3), had construed the new
regulations as having eliminated the review of decisions by arbitrators. 97
Subsequently, NRC staff reviewed the document and, in its own regulatory
guide, approved of its conclusions concerning third-party review of
unescorted access decisions. 198
Although the panel recognized that Seminole Rock called for deference
unless NRC's interpretation was "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation,"' it refused to defer to either the NEI document or NRC's
regulatory guide. 99 The court provided three "independently sufficient
reasons" why Seminole Rock deference did not apply. 200 First, it found that
deference is not appropriate when there is "'reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on
the matter in question.' ' 20' Because NRC staff had simply endorsed the
entire NEI document, it was too attenuated to constitute the agency's fair
and considered judgment on the issue of arbitral review.20 2 The court also
seemed suspicious of the fact that such an interpretation would contradict
NRC's previous view on the issue.20 3 Next, the court noted how NRC had
itself disclaimed that its regulatory guide should be relied on as a
representation of its interpretation; it lacked "authoritative glossH." 20 4
Finally, the panel opined that the application of Seminole Rock in this case
would conflict with the APA because NRC's interpretation would
contradict its own prior interpretation. The court found that such a result
would amount to the promulgation of a "legislative rule," which would
require following the APA.2u5 In other words, NRC was required to, at a
minimum, announce its change of position "in a 'reasoned analysis' in the
Federal Register or arguably was required to engage in "full notice-and-
comment procedures."20 6 Absent such actions, the court found that it
would not endorse its interpretation under cover of agency deference
principles.207
196. Id. at 569.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 570, 575 78.
200. Id. at 576.
201. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
202. Id. at 576 77.
203. Id. at 577.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 577 78.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 578 (allowing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to overrule prior
policy without a reasoned explanation would "undermine democratic transparency and
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In sum, with respect to considerations surrounding the consistency of the
interpretation and whether it reflects the agency's fair and reasoned
judgment, the circuits with the exception of the D.C. Circuit and Seventh
Circuit have been relatively consistent, no pun intended, in enforcing this
aspect of the Supreme Court's Seminole Rock analysis. Any conflict existing
among the circuits arises primarily from their inconsistent formulation of
the analysis with respect to the related post hoc rationalization and fair and
reasoned judgment factors. Each panel's specific factual application of how
much weight to accord a prior inconsistent or consistent interpretation is
less problematic. But with respect to the interplay with the APA, the
circuits are divided as to whether the APA precludes Seminole Rock deference
where the agency has significantly changed its interpretation of one of its
regulations in a subsequent interpretive rule.
4. Whether the Regulation being Interpreted Merely Repeats Statutoy Language
As the Supreme Court observed in Gonzales v. Oregon, "[a]n agency does
not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of
using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected
merely to paraphrase the statutory language. ' 20 8 The Court, therefore,
created the "anti-parroting" factor in the Seminole Rock analysis, whereby if
the regulation that the agency purports to interpret merely restates or
parrots the statutory language, the agency's proffered interpretation is not
actually an interpretation of the regulation. Rather, it is actually the
agency's interpretation of the statutory language, which makes the Seminole
Rock deference doctrine inapplicable to this situation.
This factor has been widely accepted by the circuits as a limit to the
Seminole Rock doctrine and appears prominently in Seminole Rock cases in the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits. 20 9
upset the settled expectations of regulated parties"). But see Abraham Lincoln Mem'l Hosp.
v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536, 560 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the Parafzed Veterans doctrine
is "not persuasive" because it "conflicts with the APA's rulemaking provisions, which exempt
all interpretive rules from notice and comment").
208. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
209. See, e.g., Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus.
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 141 (1st Cir. 2013); Hagans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d
287, 293 95 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing the Social Security Administration (SSA) ruling
where the agency interpreted the "term 'current,' as used in the statutory and regulatory
language concerning termination of disability benefits"); Encarnacion ex rel. George v.
Astrue, 568 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257); Shipbuilders
Council of Am. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F.3d 234, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that
Seminole Rock deference is not due when a regulation "parrots" the statutory language
because it does not reflect 'the considerable experience and expertise the [agency has]
acquired over time with respect to the complexities of the' statutory scheme"); Fast v.
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However, like other factors, the circuits diverge on whether it is a threshold
inquiry before proceeding to the Seminole Rock analysis or whether it is
simply part of the multi-factored inquiry.
For example, in the First Circuit case of Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New
England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, a private equity fund
sought a declaratory judgment from the district court that would preclude it
from being subject to "withdrawal liability" under the MPPAA. 210 In
rejecting the federal agency's interpretation of a regulation defining the
term "trade or business" that had been set forth in an appeals letter, the
district court found that this interpretation "was owed deference only to the
extent it could persuade." 211 On appeal, the agency argued that its letter
should have received Seminole Rock deference. 212 Rejecting this argument,
the panel cited the anti-parroting principle as an impediment to granting
the agency deference in this situation. 213 The court explained the agency
had not defined "trades or businesses," but rather had referred to U.S.
Treasury regulations, which had also not defined that phrase. 214
Another example of where a circuit recognized the "anti-parroting"
exception as an initial factor is the Second Circuit case of Encarnacion ex rel.
George.215 There, the court was called upon to determine whether to defer
to a policy implemented by the Commissioner of Social Security that had
excluded certain children from Supplemental Security Income Benefits. 216
The plaintiffs, a putative class of children affected by the policy, argued that
the policy conflicted with both the underlying statute as well as the
implementing regulations. 217 The court noted that an agency does not get
additional authority to "interpret its own words" when it chooses to parrot
the statutory language "instead of using its expertise and experience to
formulate a regulation." 218
Applebee's Infl, Inc., 638 F.3d 872 (Sth Cir. 2011); Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2008); Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d
1168, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that deference applies where the regulation "does not
simply 'restate the terms of the statute itself ").
210. Sun Capital Partners II, LP, 724 F.3d at 141.
211. 1d. at 137.
212. Id. at 140.
213. Id. at 141.
214. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006)) ('An agency does not
acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory
language."').
215. 568 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
216. Id. at 73.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 79 (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257).
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In a leading Seminole Rock case from the Third Circuit, Hagans v.
Commissioner of Social Security, the court reviewed the Social Security
Administration's (SSA's) interpretations of both a statutory provision and its
regulation containing the term "current." 219 In declining to give deference
to the SSA's interpretation, the court cited the parroting exception during
its overall analysis as a threshold inquiry. 220 It found that the anti-parroting
exception precluded giving the agency's interpretation Seminole Rock
deference based on the "similarity between the disputed terms occurring in
the statute and the regulation." 221
The Fourth Circuit, in Shipbuilders Council of America v. US. Coast Guard,
assessed the Coast Guard's interpretation of a regulation concerning the
eligibility of a vessel to receive a "coastwise endorsement" to engage in
trade within the United States. 222 It reviewed the district court's decision
not to give Seminole Rock223 deference to the Coast Guard's interpretation
because the language in the Coast Guard regulation at issue constituted a
parroting regulation. 224 Although it did not need to reach the question of
whether the regulation at issue indeed did parrot the statutory provision, it
did endorse this aspect of the Seminole Rock standard. 225 And in a 2012 case,
EEOC v. Randstad, the circuit re-affirmed its understanding that this was a
factor in considering whether to defer when it concluded that "[t]his is also
not a situation where 'the underlying regulation does little more than
restate the terms of the statute itself,' in which case Auer deference would be
unwarranted." 2 26
219. Hagans v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 293 95 (3d Cir. 2012).
220. Id. at 295 n.8 (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257) (declining to apply Seminole Rock
deference because "[a]n agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own
words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language"').
221. Id.
222. Shipbuilders Council of Am. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir.
2009).
223. Although the court in the Fourth Circuit generally uses the phrase, "Auer"
deference, the court has noted that "[fhis type of review of agency action is also sometimes
referred to as Seminole Rock deference ... and [b]oth terms denote the same level of deference
and are applied in precisely the same circumstances." Id. at 242 n.2.
224. Id. at 242 43 (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256) (finding that Seminole Rock
deference is not due when a regulation "parrots" the statutory language because it does not
reflect .'the considerable experience and expertise the [agency has] acquired over time with
respect to the complexities of the' statutory scheme").
225. Id. at 243 (finding because the "district court erred in its application of the Skidmore
standard, we need not reach the question of whether the major component language of the
reguladtion merely parrots the language" of the federal act at issue).
226. EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433, 445 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S.
at 257).
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The Eighth Circuit applied this factor in Fast v. Applebee's International, Inc.,
where it analyzed a DOL regulation that had established a "dual jobs" test
to determine an employee's right to minimum wage. 227 But, like the First
and Second Circuits, it did so as a preliminary inquiry to the analysis. The
court found that the regulation was "not a mere recitation of the words
used by Congress in the statute" and that the dual jobs test was "'a creature
of the [DOL's] own regulation."' 2 8 On that basis, it found that the anti-
parroting canon did not apply and that DOL's interpretation would prevail
"'unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'' 229 It then
proceeded with its Seminole Rock analysis.
The anti-parroting factor also featured prominently in the Tenth Circuit
case of Plateau Mining Corp. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Commission. 230 In Plateau Mining, the court reviewed the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission's interpretation of a safety regulation
relating to bleeder systems for methane gas ventilation that contained an
implicit requirement that such systems "shall function effectively." 23' It
recognized that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation normally
was controlling, but then cited the anti-parroting factor as an "exception to
the general rule." 232 After examining the history of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, the underlying statutory provision at issue,
and the interim and final regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, the
court found that "the concern underlying the Gonzales exception to Auer
deference" did not apply because of the significant differences between the
regulation and the statute. 233 Thus, the Tenth Circuit also views this factor
as an exception that takes an interpretation that parrots a regulation out of
Seminole Rock's scope, rather than a separate factor to consider when
determining whether to defer.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit looked at this factor as an anti-parroting
exception in Haas v. Peake.234 At issue in Haas was the interpretation of the
statutory phrase "in the Republic of Vietnam" as it related to a statute and
accompanying regulations granting benefits to veterans exposed to the
toxin Agent Orange while in military service. 235 After finding that statutory
227. Fast v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 638 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2011).
228. Id. at 879 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
229. Id.
230. Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.3d
1176, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1193.
234. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
235. Id. at 1172.
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term ambiguous, the court sought to interpret the Department of Veteran
Affairs' (DVA's) regulation that defined that term to mean "'service in the
waters offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of service
involved duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam."' 236 Because the
language of the DVA regulation was ambiguous, the court looked to DVA's
interpretation and noted that its interpretation would normally be
controlling. 237 But it then clarified that Seminole Rock deference would "not
apply if a particular regulation merely 'parrots' statutory language, because
if it did, an agency could bypass meaningful rule-making procedures by
simply adopting an informal 'interpretation' of regulatory language taken
directly from the statute in question." 238
However, after analyzing the DVA regulation, the court found that the
regulation did more than simply parrot the statute. 239 Unlike the situation
in Gonzales where the agency had repeated and summarized the statutory
language, here, the court found that the DVA regulation elaborated on the
statutory term by clarifying and expanding it to cover personnel who served
offshore and in other locations as long as the service "involved duty or
visitation in the Republic of Vietnam." 240 This language, in the court's
view, qualified as "interpretation rather than reiteration." 24' Therefore, it
held that, as a threshold issue, the anti-parroting exception to the Seminole
Rock deference doctrine did not apply; the court then proceeded to analyze
whether the interpretation was "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation" at issue. 242
In sum, no circuit has expressed a doctrinal concern regarding the
premise underlying the anti-parroting factor that an "agency does not
acquire special authority" when it has paraphrased statutory language. 243
But the circuits do vary on how they approach the anti-parroting analysis;
some making it a threshold inquiry as an exception to the Seminole Rock
doctrine, while others merely apply it as one of many factors to consider.
Thus, the Seminole Rock doctrine would benefit if the Court would provide
direction, such as a more established framework that would include the
anti-parroting factor as a required, and perhaps, threshold, inquiry for
236. Id. at 1186 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2007)).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1186 87 (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) and
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)) (stating that "an agency cannot
'under the guise of interpreting a regulation ... create defacto a new regulation'.




243. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257.
[66:4
2014] SPLITS IN THE ROC: THE SEMIVOLE ROCKDEFERENCE DOCTRINE 823
courts to make when determining whether to grant Seminole Rock deference.
5. Whether the Agency Interpretation Appears in a Format that Carries the Force of
Law
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme
Court established a two-step test when analyzing an agency's interpretation
of a statute administered by that agency. Under Step One, a court reviews
the statutory language to assess whether Congress has directly spoken on
the question at issue. 244 If the statute's language is unambiguous, then the
court's analysis is done, and the agency's interpretation of the statutory
provision is irrelevant.2 45 If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, the
court proceeds to Step Two, whereby the court determines whether the
agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute."2 46 If the agency's proffered interpretation is reasonable, then the
interpretation is controlling. 247
In 2000, however, the Chevron doctrine changed dramatically. In
Christensen v. Ham's County, the Supreme Court found that controlling
deference under Chevron should not be granted to an agency's interpretation
of a statute that is expressed in a format which lacks the force of law, such
as an opinion letter.2 48 The next year, in United States v. Mead Corp., the
Court similarly ruled that a court should only grant an agency Chevron
deference when the interpretation of a statute is authorized by Congress
and such interpretation carries with it the force of law.2 49 The Court's
decisions generally mean that formal interpretations of ambiguous statutes
(i.e., notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudications) are entitled
to Chevron deference, but informal interpretations of ambiguous statutes
which lack the force of law should be reviewed under the less deferential
standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 2 50
These holdings, however, as scholars have noted, raise a potential
doctrinal inconsistency between Chevron deference and Seminole Rock
deference because the Supreme Court had "repudiated strong deference for
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes contained in formats lacking
the force of law, while apparently endorsing strong deference for agency
244. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
245. Id. at 842 43.
246. Id. at 843.
247. Id. at 843 44.
248. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
249. 533 U.S. 218, 226 27 (2001).
250. Id. at 237 ("Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances
indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where
such authority was not invoked.").
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interpretations of ambiguous regulations contained in such formats." 25'
This is so because, under the Seminole Rock standard, which the Supreme
Court reaffirmed in Christensen, such interpretations of agency regulations
would continue to receive controlling deference. 252
This confusion has now created a conflict between some circuits and the
Supreme Court, as well as splits among the circuits. Panels in some
circuits, such as the First and Seventh Circuits, have found that Seminole
Rock deference did not "survive" Christensen, while the majority of circuits
have found that it did.25 3 For instance, the Second Circuit, in Taylor v.
Vermont Department of Education, recognized that the Supreme Court in
Christensen had "rejected the notion that Chevron deference was due an
agency's informal interpretation of an ambiguous statute," but held that
Christensen did "not overrule the longstanding rule regarding the deference
generally owed to an agency's reading of its own regulations," which are
almost always set forth in an informal manner and therefore do not have
the force of law. 254
The Second Circuit has since reached similar conclusions. In Encarnacion
ex rel. George v. Astrue, it held that "regardless of the formality of the
procedures used to formulate it," an agency's interpretation of a regulation
is "'controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation[s]."' 2 5 5 More recently, in Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., the
court cited an earlier Second Circuit case that stated, "'while agency
interpretations that lack the force of law do not warrant deference when
they interpret ambiguous statutes, they do normally warrant deference when
they interpret ambiguous regulations.' 25
The Fourth Circuit has also set forth its definitive view that the Supreme
251. See Anthony & Asimow, supra note 8, at 10.
252. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
253. See, e.g., Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2006) (continuing to
apply Auer deference after Christensen (internal citations omitted)). It also noted that "[fIhis
circuit is not alone in this conclusion." Id. at 931 n. 1 (citing M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp.
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 432 F.3d 127, 139 (2d Cir. 2005); Rain & Hail Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Fed.
Crop Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d 976, 979 (Sth Cir. 2005); Spectrum Health Continuing Care Grp.
v. Anna Marie Bowling Irrecoverable Trust DatedJune 27, 2002, 410 F.3d 304, 319 (6th
Cir. 2005); Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 306 07 (4th Cir. 2004); Wells Fargo
Bank of Tex. NA v.James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003)).
254. Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 780 n.7 (2d Cir. 2002).
255. Encarnacion ex rel. George v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotingAuer,
519 U.S. at 461).
256. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 207 08 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 222 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (pronouncing "Auer was seemingly undercut by Christensen ....
which held that many forms of agency interpretations that lack the force of law do not merit
Chevron deference").
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Court's decision in Christensen concerning agency interpretations of statutes
that did not carry the force of law had no effect on the Seminole Rock
analysis. For example, in Humanoids Group v. Rogan, the court analyzed the
Seminole Rock doctrine and highlighted the difference between
interpretations of statutes and regulations: "'agency interpretations that lack
the force of law (such as those embodied in opinion letters and policy
statements) do not warrant Chevron-style deference when they interpret
ambiguous statutes but do receive deference under Auer when interpreting
ambiguous regulations."' 257 As evidenced even more recently in a 2013 case,
D.L. ex rel. KL v. Baltimore Board of School Commissioners, where the panel
confirmed that it grants "Auer deference even when the agency interpreting
its regulation issues its interpretation through an informal process," it is
clear that this view prevails in the Fourth Circuit. 258
The Sixth Circuit, too, has addressed the effect of the Supreme Court's
holding in Christensen. A panel of the Sixth Circuit in Air Brake Systems, Inc. v.
Mineta, explicitly opined on the issue of whether informal interpretation of
regulations that do not carry the force of law still warranted Seminole Rock
deference. 259 Citing other Sixth Circuit panel decisions, such as United
States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., A.D. Transport Express, Inc. v. United States, and
American Express v. United States, the panel concluded "Seminole Rock deference
appears to have survived Mead."260
The Ninth Circuit in Bassiri v. Xerox Corp. has similarly found that "the
Christensen [C]ourt did not overrule Auer."26' The panel noted that the
Supreme Court in Christensen had cited Auer as the test for an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation. 2ib And the panel held that it
would "continue to apply Auer deference to an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation." 26 3
Several cases in the Federal Circuit also show that the circuit has
accepted the parameters established by the Court with respect to agency
257. Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
It also rejected arguments that the interpretation by PTO would effectively constitute a ."de
facto new regulation,' thereby removing it from the scope ofAuer." Id.
258. D.L. ex rel. K.L.v. Baltimore Bd. of School Comm'rs, 706 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir.
2013).
259. Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 644 (6th Cir. 2004).
260. Id. The court also cited justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Mead. Id. (quodng
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (ScaliaJ., dissenting)) ("'T]he court
leaves untouched today [ [the principle] that judges must defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of their own regulations."').
261. Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Christensen v.
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
262. Jd. at930 31.
263. Id. at 931.
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interpretations of regulations that are set forth in formats that do not carry
the force of law. First, the circuit has acknowledged in cases such as Smith v.
]Ficholson that, as a threshold matter, Seminole Rock "deference is afforded to
an agency's interpretation of its own regulations even when that
interpretation is offered in informal rulings such as in a litigating
document.'' 64 In another case, American Signature, Inc. v. United States, the
court recognized that "the question whether an agency's interpretation of
its regulations announced for the first time in a brief is entitled to deference
has generated considerable authority both in the Supreme Court and our
own court."2 6 5 Citing its previous decisions in Reizenstein v. Shinseki,26 6 Abbott
Laboratories v. United States, 72 6  and Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States,26 8 it
noted that under Federal Circuit precedent, "Where the agency's
interpretation seeks to advance its litigating position, deference is typically
not afforded to the agency's position announced in a brief"'26 9 But citing
the Supreme Court's decision in Auer, the court further observed that an
agency interpretation of a regulation found in a legal brief would receive
Seminole Rock deference as long as it was not a "'post hoc rationalizatio[n]
advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action from attack,''
and "' [t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not
reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question.'"2 70
Decisions from the First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, however, have
suggested a contrary view.2 7' In Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England
Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, the First Circuit questioned
whether to defer to the interpretation set forth in the agency's letter because
the "letter was not the result of public notice and comment, and merely
involved an informal adjudication resolving a dispute between a pension
fund and the equity fund."2 72 Citing the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in
264. Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452,461 (1997)).
265. Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 63).
266. 583 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
267. 573 F.3d 1327, 1332 33 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
268. 450 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
269. Am. Signature, Inc., 598 F.3d at 827 (citations omited) ('Deference to what appears
to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely
inappropriate."').
270. Id. (citingAuer, 519 U.S. at 462).
271. See Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus.
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 2013); Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 993 (7th
Cir. 2003).
272. Sun Capital Partners II, LP, 724 F.3d at 140.
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Christensen, the panel reasoned that "interpretations contained in formats
such as opinion letters are 'entitled to respect' .. . only to the extent that
those interpretations have the 'power to persuade,"' thereby rejecting
Seminole Rock deference. 273  But the court failed to appreciate that this
holding cited in Christensen came in the context of an agency's interpretation
of a statutory provision not an agency's interpretation of a regulation. 274
Thus, the First Circuit's contrary interpretation is inconsistent with the
actual reach of Christensen's holding on this point, and also in conflict
because the Court in Christensen cited Auer approvingly when deferring to
the agency's informal interpretation of a regulation set forth in a legal
brief 275
Finally, Judge Posner's 2003 opinion on behalf of a unanimous panel of
the Seventh Circuit also suggested that Seminole Rock deference had likely
been eviscerated based on his interpretation of the Supreme Court's
holdings in Mead and Christensen. He concluded that "[p]robably there is
little left of Auer[/Seminole Rock deference]." 276 At issue in Keys v. Barnhart
was a guardian's request for Social Security disability benefits on behalf of
Napoleon Keys, a fourteen-year-old. 277 An administrative law judge had
ruled that he was not disabled within the meaning of the disability benefit
regulations, which were interim regulations at the time. 278 Thereafter, SSA
adopted final regulations, which altered the definition of childhood
disability. 279 Thus, the question on review was whether "the old (interim)
or the new (final) regulations" governed the case.280
In rejecting SSA's argument that the interim regulations should apply,
the court found that the government's interpretation was not saved by
Chevron's deferential standard of review. 281 The court reasoned that because
SSA's interpretation was set forth in a legal brief, this type of informal
statutory interpretation might only be subject to Skidmore deference 28 2 under
273. Id. (quoting Christensen v. Harris Crny., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) and Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
275. Id.
276. Kys, 347 F.3d at 993; see also Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265
F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 222 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) ("[A]s the Seventh Circuit has noted, Auer was seemingly
undercut by Christensen v. Harris County, which held that many forms of agency intrpretations
that lack the force of law do not merit Chevron deference.").
277. Ks, 347 F.3dat991 92.
278. Id. at 992.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 993.
282. Id.; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (citations omited)
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the Supreme Court's then-recent decision United States v. Mead Corp.28 3
Judge Posner's "hedge" on this issue, he explained, concerned the
Supreme Court's seemingly contrary holding in Auer v. Robbins that Chevron
deference extends to agency interpretations found in legal briefs, including
an amicus curiae brief.2 84  He then suggested that Auer had likely been
significantly weakened based on the Supreme Court's view that
interpretations of statutes which lack the force of law no longer warrant
controlling deference, and, therefore since an agency cannot make law with
a brief, an informal interpretation found in a brief should not receive
controlling deference.2 85 But in the end, he declined to grant Chevron
deference to the agency's interpretation because the government's brief had
not offered an interpretation of the agency's regulation. 286
Thus, like the panel's view in the First Circuit, Judge Posner's view is not
shared by the majority of circuits. Accordingly, given the confusion among
these panels, clarification by the Supreme Court during a subsequent case
involving the Seminole Rock doctrine or during its re-evaluation of the
doctrine, in toto, would benefit the courts of appeals on this issue.
6. Whether the Agency has a Specialized Expertise in the Matter in Question
In Thomas jefferson University v. Shalala, the Court identified an additional
factor to consider when determining whether to defer to an agency's
interpretation of a regulation: whether the interpretive question involves
issues in which the agency has specialized expertise.2 87 In Thomas jefferson
Universy, the Court examined a Medicare regulation that prohibited
reimbursement of certain educational activities borne by hospitals.28 8 The
Secretary of HHS interpreted the regulation "to bar reimbursement of
educational costs that were borne in prior years not by the requesting
hospital, but by the hospital's affiliated medical school."2 89
In analyzing the regulation, the Court held that it must defer to HHS's
interpretation unless an "'alternative reading is compelled by the
("[U]nder Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the [tariff classification] ruling [by the U.S. Customs
Service] is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness."); see also Anthony &
Asimow, supra note 8, at 10 11 (discussing the holding of Christensen and the adoption of
informal agency interpretations).
283. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218.
284. Kys, 347 F.3d at 993; see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
285. Kys, 347 F.3d at 993; see Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
286. Kys, 347 F.3d at 994 ("W]e doubt that Chevron has any role to play in this case
because the government's brief did not offer an interpretation of the agency's regulations.").
287. ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
288. Id. at 506.
289. Id.
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regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent
at the time of the regulation's promulgation,"' which was the Seminole Rock
test it had set forth in Gardebring v. jenkins. 290  It then highlighted an
additional factor that the broad deference afforded under Seminole Rock was
"all the more warranted when.., the regulation concerns 'a complex and
highly technical regulatory program .... "'29 To support the application of
this factor in this case, the Court noted that HHS had been responsible for
identifying and classifying criteria in the complex cost reimbursement
regime of the Medicare program and subsequently deferred to HHS. 292
Although not all circuits have incorporated whether the agency has
"specialized expertise" as a "stand-alone" factor in their Seminole Rock
analysis, there are some panels that have placed significant weight on it.
Examples are found in decisions by panels in the First, Third, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits. 293 In addition, the Fourth Circuit appears to stand alone in
rgecting to give Seminole Rock deference to interpretations of regulations that
are not based on an expertise in a given field.
In West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Norton, the Fourth Circuit was
called upon to decide whether the Department of Interior's Board of Land
Appeals (Board) had properly interpreted its own regulation in deciding
that the plaintiff was ineligible for an award of attorney fees under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. 294 The court acknowledged
that Seminole Rock deference normally applies to the Board's interpretation
of its own regulation,295 but it refused to apply the doctrine in this case. 296
It held that "'[w]hen the administrative interpretation is not based on
expertise in the particular field ... but is based on general common law
principles, great deference is not required."' 297 The court justified its use of
this "exception to Seminole Rock deference" as being necessary to allow
courts to review an agency's legal determination de novo, which it then
proceeded to do with respect to the Board's decision. 298
290. Id. at 512 (quoting Gardebring v.Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415,430 (1988)).
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
293. Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quoting the standard set forth in Thomas Jeferson Univ. v. Shalala); Morrison v. Madison
Dearborn Capital Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2006); S. Shore Hosp., Inc.
v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 97 (lst Cir. 2002); HealthEast Bethesda Lutheran Hosp. &
Rehab. Ctr. v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 415, 417 (Sth Cir. 1998).
294. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Norton, 343 F.3d 239, 241, 245 (4th Cir.
2003).
295. Id. at 245.
296. Id. at 245 46.
297. Id. at 245.
298. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit's analysis in West Virginia Highlands, therefore, stands
in stark contrast to other circuits, which have found that agency expertise
makes deference even more appropriate and have not required it as a sine
qua non to apply Seminole Rock. For instance, the First Circuit in South Shore
Hospital, Inc. v. Thompson, reviewed a different Medicare regulation involving
reimbursement for the reasonable costs of specified services performed by
skilled nursing facilities.2 99 The court first noted that courts normally defer
to agency interpretations of regulations and that a court should only
withhold Seminole Rock deference when the agency's interpretation is
"'plainly erroneous or inconsistent' with the regulation at issue. 300 It then
highlighted that Seminole Rock deference "is at its apex" when the regulation
is within Medicare's "'complex and highly technical regulatory
program."' 30' After finding the regulation in question vague, the court
deferred to the agency's interpretation and also concluded its opinion by
citing Thomas Jefferson for the proposition that "Medicare is a complex and
highly technical regulatory scheme, and courts should be hesitant to
second-guess the Secretary in such matters." 30 2
The Third Circuit, too, has looked to the factor as an additional reason
to defer under Seminole Rock. For example, in Morrison v. Madison Dearborn
Capital Partners III L.P., the circuit quoted a litany of Supreme Court cases
on deference to agency interpretations when it determined that it should
defer to SEC's interpretation of a new regulation it had just promulgated
involving derivative securities and short-swing trading. 30 3 Besides quoting
the Seminole Rock standard, 30 4 it noted that an "agency's reasonable
interpretation of its own regulations attracts substantial judicial
deference,"'' 305 and that "[d]eference is especially warranted when the
regulations concern 'a complex and highly technical regulatory
program."'' 30 6 After analyzing this specialized area of law, it deferred to the
SEC's interpretation. 307
Likewise, in a 2012 case, a panel of the Fourth Circuit in Almy v. Sebelius
recognized "the importance of careful adherence" to the Seminole Rock
299. S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 95 (1st Cir. 2002).
300. Id. at 97.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 98, 106.
303. Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 314 15
(3d Cir. 2006).
304. Id. at 315 (quoting ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
(finding .'the agency's interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"')
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting T/omasJefrrson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512).
307. Id.
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standard in cases that involve "'a complex and highly technical regulatory
program."'308 Here, the court reviewed the Secretary of HHS's
interpretation of a Medicare regulation. 30 9 The court noted that parties
had agreed that the regulation in question was technical and complex and
also found that HHS "'has longstanding expertise in the area,'
circumstances under which 'principles of deference have particular
force."' 310 In concluding its decision that HHS's actions had been lawful,
the court noted the circuit's view that the Medicare provisions were
C1among the most completely impenetrable texts within human
experience."' 3 11
Finally, a unanimous panel of the Eighth Circuit, in HealthEast Bethesda
Lutheran Hospital & Rehabilitation Center v. Shalala, reviewed yet another
interpretation of a Medicare regulation by the Secretary of HHS. 312
Although the court unceremoniously concluded that the Secretary's
interpretation was not "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation,"' it did analyze the agency expertise factor. 3 13 Specifically, the
court addressed the plaintiffs argument that Seminole Rock deference should
not apply to the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation in question
because the interpretation did not require the Secretary's "technical
expertise." The court flatly rejected this argument. It found that even
though deference may be especially warranted when the regulations are of
a highly technical nature, the rationale for deference did not disappear in
simpler cases where an agency interprets its own regulation. 314
Accordingly, it granted "'controlling weight' to the Secretary's
interpretation of the regulation at issue. 315
Thus, when the courts of appeals analyze the agency expertise factor, the
circuits are split in two respects. First, the Fourth Circuit and Eighth
Circuit are squarely split as to whether an agency must have expertise in
the matter in question as a predicate to giving Seminole Rock deference to the
interpretation, with the Fourth Circuit holding that agency expertise is
required and the Eighth Circuit holding that it is not. Second, the circuits
are divided on their application of the agency expertise factor. Panels in
some circuits closely follow the Supreme Court's holding in To7masjeflerson
308. Almy v. Sebelius, 679 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2012).
309. Jd. at299 301.
310. Jd. at 302.
311. Jd. at 311.
312. HealthEast Bethesda Lutheran Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr. v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 415, 416
(8th Cir. 1998).
313. Jd. at417.
314. Id. (quoting ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
315. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
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University v. Shalala that suggests Seminole Rock deference is even more
appropriate in such cases, while other panels fail to even mention the factor
as being probative in its inquiry. Guidance by the Supreme Court on the
application and analysis of this factor would therefore be especially
appropriate in a future case.
In sum, the analysis above indicates that although the courts of appeals
are certainly aware of the Seminole Rock standard and its many factors, their
applications of it differ significantly in several important respects. Of
foremost importance is the apparent conflict over the precise impact of
Mead and Christensen on the Seminole Rock doctrine. The misinterpretation of
this issue by certain circuits, however, can be easily resolved by the
Supreme Court in a future case. More fundamentally though, serious
substantive problems remain with the way the courts of appeals are
interpreting the doctrine that should be corrected by the Supreme Court.
The practical impact of the conflicting interpretations of what the
applicable "test" is for deference under the Seminole Rock doctrine is deeply
troubling. The application of any non-uniform standard, which could
include none, one, two, or all of the various factors outlined above
depending on those which a particular panel chooses to include could
directly affect the determination of whether to defer and, therefore,
ultimately impact the conclusion as to the questioned regulation's meaning.
Thus, the determination of a regulation's meaning could curiously differ
depending on which circuit hears the case and whether that circuit included
or attached particular significance to a factor in its own Seminole Rock test.
Uniformity and consistency are hallmarks of our administrative and judicial
states, and the current application of differing Seminole Rock standards
significantly undermines these vital goals.
CONCLUSION
Inconsistency and widespread confusion regarding the precise
parameters of the proper analysis under Seminole Rock have led to conflicting
interpretations and application of the doctrine by the courts of appeals.
Because regulations, rather than statutes, are the principal way in which
legal rights and obligations are established, the in-practice application of
the Seminole Rock deference regime is critically important. Accordingly, a re-
evaluation by the Supreme Court would help resolve the inconsistencies
and conflicts among the circuits. More importantly, it would lead to more
clarity and uniformity in this important area of administrative law, which
ultimately should promote greater fairness, increased transparency, and
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more meaningful public participation.
A future re-examination of the Seminole Rock doctrine by the Supreme
Court could take many forms: the outright rejection of the doctrine; the
creation of a consistent framework or test, such as what currently exists for
statutory interpretation under Chevron; or the addition of more chaos by
endorsing the doctrine without adding limits or parameters for the lower
courts to apply. Regardless, any meaningful reconsideration of the doctrine
by the Court would be a positive step in the development of the doctrine as
it approaches its seventh decade.

